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21.  Introduction
This paper  explores  the long-term  fiscal effects of an aging population  in New Zealand
and considers  several options available  to government  for containing  and financing its
future liabilities.  Using the New Zealand Treasury long-term fiscal model, the paper
analyzes  the  baseline  fiscal  outlook  and  its  sensitivity to  several  economic,
demographic,  and policy assumptions. The results are presented from two different
perspectives: In a balanced  budget-tax  rate (or zero net debt) approach,  which shows
the dynamics in the annual tax revenues that would be  needed to balance future
budgets; and in a constant tax rate (or tax smoothing) approach, which shows the
dynamics  in the government  financial  position  when  tax rates are held constant.
Based on the survey  of international  literature  and the sensitivity  tests, the paper
derives several policy options for alleviating both the demographic  pressures  on the
future fiscal balances and the problem of government financing in the long term.
Attention is given  to a calculation  of the government  gross implicit pension  debt, to the
tradeoff between  a pre-funding  of future spending  and future tax increases,  and to the
fiscal and behavioral  implications  relating  to the level of New Zealand Superannuation
(NZS)  benefits.
2.  An Aging Population
An  aging  population  is  an  international phenomenon of  growing  concern  to
governments  and multilateral  institutions. Studies  have  examined  issues relating  to the
public provision  for retirement,  in particular the implications  of pension promises for
future government  liabilities  and for economic  efficiency  and national  saving.
2.1.  Implicit  Public  Pension  Liabilities
Because of the increasing  difficulty of maintaining  fiscal balance in an aging society,
recent studies by the OECD, IMF, and World Bank have advised governments  to
consider  and periodically  measure  implicit  public pension  liabilities  for current  and future
generations (OECD 1993 and 1995; IMF 1996a; and Kane and Palacios 1996.) The
studies have concentrated  on countries with large social security systems and direct
3unfunded commitments  to  pay defined-benefit  pensions to  individuals, which may
require  very high contributions  in order  to be sustained  as the population  ages.  1
Quantifying and reporting the government's  pension commitments  make public
pension financing more transparent,  promote fiscal responsibility,  and allow for timely
adjustments to the  program.  For these purposes it  is  sufficient to  calculate the
discounted  value  of total public pension  benefits  to be paid in the long  term. Analysis  of
the cost of replacing a  pay-as-you-go  (PAYG) system with a fully funded scheme
requires separate calculation of  the  value  of  pension  commitments to  existing
pensioners  and the value  of pension  commitments  "accrued"  by current  workers  (based
on past contributions,  years of employment,  or age), 2
The implicit  gross public pension liability  can be calculated  for both a limited and
an unlimited time period starting at any point in time.  It is usually expressed in its
present  value as a percentage  of GDP  estimated  at the starting  year:
i=b
PV ( r,  Y-i=a  ni)
GPPL  =
GDPi=a
where  GPPL  is the implicit  gross public  pension  liability,
r  is the discount  rate,
ni  is the nominal  public  pension  expense  in year i,
a  is the starting  year,
b  is the ending  year, and
GDP_=_  is current  GDP  at year a.
1  The  largest  and least  transparent  public  pension  liabilities  arise in the pay-as-you-go  (PAYG)  systems.
Governments'  claims  that  their pension  promises  are not liabilities  in the legal  sense  have been  already  challenged
in several  countries  (World  Bank  1994). Government  liabilities  also  arise  from implicit  guarantees  that it will protect
pensioners  against  the default  or failure  of private  pension  schemes.
In some  cases,  the government  could  benefit  by legally  commiting  itself  to protecting  the elderly  from poverty.
For moral  and political  reasons,  most  governments  will ensure  that a minimum  pension  is paid. By making  this
commitment  legally  binding  the government  could  emphasize  that public pensions  are  part  of social  safety  net and
that individuals  must  save  privately  to maintain  their standard  of living after  retirement  (World  Bank  1994).
4Given the  baseline assumptions (see section 3.3.) and a discount rate of 5
percent, the gross implicit New Zealand Superannuation  (NZS) liability faced by the
government  of New Zealand for the period 1995-2050  comes to about 236 percent  of
1995/96 GDP.  Although this value is relatively  high, it compares  favorably with most
OECD  countries. (For international  comparisons,  see IMF 1996a.)
Table 1.  Baseline estimates of gross liabilities of public pension systems in
selected  industrial  countries
(percent of 1995 GDP)
Country





United  Kingdom  148
Canada  214
Sweden  291
New  Zealand  236
Average  322
Source:  Estimates by IMF staff and the NZ Treasury fiscal model.
The  sensitivity of gross public pension liabilities to  the  underlying economic
assumptions  varies by type of pension scheme  (e.g. an earnings-related  versus a flat-
pension).  For the NZS, the sensitivity of the gross liability is weak.  With respect to
productivity,  for example, a forecasted  2 percent productivity  growth a year brings  the
gross liability  to about 266 percent  of 1995/96 GDP, whereas a forecasted 1 percent
productivity  growth a year implies the gross liability of about 211 percent of 1995/96
GDP.  This difference  is caused mainly  by the wage indexation  of NZS benefits,  which
causes higher productivity  growth to lead to greater NZS expense in nominal terms
(even  though the expense  remains  constant  as a percentage  of then-current  GDP).
2.2.  Saving  and Public  Pension  Adequacy
Most international  time-series  studies confirm that possible adverse behavioral  effects
of public pensions are correlated with the expected generosity of the plan (see the
literature surveys in World Bank 1994 and IMF 1996a, b).  Arguments against any
5public provision  of pensions  are weak as long as public pensions  serve as a pure safety
net (subsistence  level of support) for people in long-term  poverty and unable  to save,
and as insurance  against failures in the capital and insurance  markets  and in personal
asset management. The effects of the mere existence  of a public pension  scheme on
private  saving are ambiguous  (see Box 1).  3
There is no evidence  that the replacement  of a PAYG system  by other forms of
provision for  retirement would significantly boost national saving.  An  IMF study
concluded  that there is "no strong theoretical  argument  or compelling  evidence  for the
view  that the replacement  of a PAYG  defined-benefits  public sector plan by a defined-
contributions  plan along the lines of the Chilean  system  will increase  aggregate  saving.
... Similarly,  there is no compelling  reason  to believe  that the addition  of a second  tier in
the form of a defined-contributions  plan to the public system should increase  saving"
(1  996b). 4
Analysis of the fiscal effects of an aging population  by the IMF (1996a,  b) and the
World Bank (1994) has suggested that governments  should gradually shore up the
existing PAYG systems  while shifting  more responsibility  for provision  for retirement  to
the private  sector. Countries  with small pension schemes  in place have been advised
to move toward fully funded systems as part of a comprehensive  reform policy to
develop a  multi-pillar pension system. 5 For countries with  large public pension
3  Other arguments concerning public provision for retirement relate to the relative depth of the domestic capital
market, possible misallocation of capital (if the government attempts to pre-fund its future pension expenses), high
taxes (if public pensions are generous, the population is aging and the PAYG system is maturing), tax evasion (if
taxation is high and the link between taxes and the pension benefit is blurred), large deficits (if rising old-age and
system-dependence ratios increase expenses on pensions, health and welfare), and excessive intergenerational
transfers during demographic transition.
The hypothesis that demographic factors themselves strongly affect saving, and predictions of a substantial
drop in both private and national saving as a result of population aging have not been supported by empirical studies
(OECD 1995).  The observed drop in national saving correlated with aging appears to be associated primarily with
the deterioration in government saving.
4  The U.S. experience suggests that development of private pension plans in addition to a PAYG system may
have a positive impact on private saving.  For a discussion see World Bank (1994) and IMF (1  996a, b).
5  The multi-pillar approach was developed by the World Bank (1994) to separate the redistributive and saving
aspects of a pension system.  The three pillars in this approach are: an obligatory universal public pension scheme
guaranteeing a basic flat pension, an obligatory enrollment in a private pension saving plan, and additional private
saving on a voluntary basis.  Private saving obligation is important primarily for societies that cannot afford to pay
from government budget for an adequate universal flat pension.  It requires, however, that several conditions be met
(such as development of the financial infrastructure and a reasonable ratio of administrative costs) and is not
suitable for every country.  For comparison of the administrative costs of the different pension schemes, see Valdes-
Prieto (1994).
6schemes, however, attempts to "privatize"  the existing PAYG schemes  and explicitly
recognize  the accrued public pension liabilities  could pose significant  fiscal risks.  In
these countries  reform proposals  have recommended  limiting  the level of and eligibility
for public pension  benefits  within  the existing  system.
To deal with the expected rise in government  pension liabilities  the IMF (1996b)
has advised governments  to (a) shift indexation of pensions to  prices rather than
wages, provided that the adequacy of pension benefits is reviewed periodically; (b)
raise  the minimum  retirement  age rather  than reduce pension  benefits;  and, if possible,
(c) adopt a sensible immigration  policy rather than active employment  policies  to boost
participation rates and  reduce unemployment. Because of  the  possible effect on
unemployment of  the  increase in  the  retirement age  pension reform should be
undertaken in conjunction with liberalization  of the labor market.  The World Bank
(1994) has suggested that indexation of pensions  to the arithmetic average of the
movement  in wages and prices  would both protect  the elderly  from poverty  and reduce
the fiscal effect of population  aging.
Testing  pension  adequacy and  setting  an  optimal public  pension  level  is
problematic because of  cross-country  differences regarding the  function of  public
pensions  and the range of methods for measuring  income adequacy. Comparing  the
different income adequacy measurements  in New Zealand, Brashares (1993) noted
that the relative earnings related measure (65 percent of net average ordinary time
weekly earnings,  which had been accepted  for setting  the floor of the NZS) implies  the
most generous income adequacy level.  Moreover,  as income differentiation  and the
spread between  average  and median  earnings rises,  the comparative  generosity  of this
standard  increases.  6
Rigorous  analysis of the link between  private  saving and government  provision  of
pensions  is beyond the scope of this paper.  The literature survey in Box 1 offers a
short summary  of the most  recent  findings.
6  For the recent  developments  in income  distribution  in New  Zealand,  see Barker  (1995)
7Box 1.  The Effect of Government Provision of Pensions on Saving: A Survey of Literature
Most studies of the impact of public pension plans on private saving have found little evidence to support
the contention that social security or public provision for retirement has reduced saving.'
In the United States, Italy, Sweden, and Japan, where publicly provided pensions were particularly
generous, rising social security benefits did seem to depress private saving. The offset effect of public
pension plans on private saving was significantly less than 100 percent, however. Thus, if public pensions
are financed by taxes rather than by government borrowing, the increase in public saving associated with
the public pension scheme is likely to exceed any reductions in private saving.
In Canada, India, Sri Lanka, Chile, Singapore, and, to a lesser extent,  Great Britain and France,
development of public pension systems has been correlated with an increase in voluntary private saving
and, possibly, with economic growth  2 (For references to specific country  studies, see IMF  1996a, b;
Corsetti and Schmidt-Hebbel 1995; Vittas and Iglesias 1992.)
The differences in the effect of the  introduction and development of a public  pension scheme on
voluntary private saving may be partly explained by the initial conditions (the initial saving rates and the
pre-existing mechanism of support for  retirement) as well as by the level of social development within
different countries. In developing countries, for example, industrialization, urbanization and the  resulting
break-down of traditional networks of transfers may bring about the need to create a social safety net and
to increase individual private saving.
Cross-country comparisons of the effect of public pension schemes on private saving levels reveal
stronger effects than do time-series studies.  The observed differences in both saving and public provision
for retirement may thus be caused by the same factors (such as traditional social preferences about both
saving and the role of government). The impact of public pension schemes on private saving may thus be
idiosyncratic to the traditions and the overall nature of policies within societies, a conclusion supported by
Jaeger (1994) in his two-equilibrium interpretation of the overlapping-generations model.
1  For a comprehensive list of references, see World Bank (1994) and IMF (1996 a, b).
2  For an explanation of this effect see World Bank (1994) and IMF (1996). The most common explanation is that government
discussion  of  providing a  minimum pension  to  the  elderly  against poverty  makes  people  more aware  that they  should  make
provisions toward their own old age (recognition effect)
The  IMF  (1996c)  concluded that "offering a general  conclusion - one that applies  across countries  - on  the  impact of
pensions on saving is not possible "  Changes in the friendliness of the existing tax system to household borrowing may outweigh
the saving effects of pensions policies, for example.
83.  The Fiscal Impact  of Population  Aging  in New Zealand
3.1.  The Model
The long-term fiscal model describes the major fiscal consequences  for the pension
system of future demographic  pressures. Economic  growth in the model depends on
population,  the labor force, the unemployment  rate, average hours worked per week,
and output per hour. The economic  forecast,  which is identical  to the official Treasury
forecast  for the first three years, is used as an input to the fiscal forecast.  Revenues
are estimated  from the effective  tax rates and tax bases. Expenditures  are divided  into
social spending,  reflecting the number  of beneficiaries  and the average benefits,  and
discretionary spending, including the  core government administration and  security
services. To  calculate social spending the model breaks out six age groups and
estimates  the cost of spending on health care, education,  and social welfare for each
group.
The model makes  no assumptions  about  the effects  of an aging population  on the
real  economy or  markets, the  economic and  behavioral effects of  taxation and
government  programs,  or indirect linkages  among macroeconomic  variables. Thus, the
model has been used mainly  to study  the sensitivity  of the baseline  fiscal outlook with
respect to small changes in the baseline assumptions. To show greater divergence
from the  baseline assumptions would require a comprehensive  ex  ante economic
analysis  and multiple  exogenous  adjustments  in the underlying  variables. 7
3.2.  Analytical  Approaches
This paper presents the analysis of the modeling results from two perspectives,  the
balanced  budget  tax rate perspective  and the constant  tax rate perspective.  These two
analytical approaches are used to study the baseline outlook, sensitivity tests, and
selected  scenarios.
The balanced  budget  tax rate (or zero net  debt) approach  is used  to determine  the
tax revenues required each year to balance the  budget.  It focuses fully on the
dynamics in government expenses (recorded at the accrual basis), and treats tax
For a detailed  description  of the model,  see Treasury  (1996).
9revenues as an endogenous  variable (total expenses minus non-tax revenues).  By
disregarding the  exogenous  pressures on  revenue  and  avoiding  government
accumulation  of financial assets, this approach insulates  the fiscal forecasts from the
8 cumulative effects of debt service and non-tax revenue.  The shortcoming of this
approach (treated in section 4.2) is its assumption of instantaneous adjustment of
revenue  to expenses.
The constant  tax rate (or tax smoothing)  approach  is used  to show the dynamics
in government revenues,  expenses, and financial assets under the assumption  that
initial tax rates remain  constant  in the long  term.  This approach  illustrates  the fact that
demographic  pressures  affect both revenues  and expenses. Future  fiscal effects  under
the different  scenarios  are shown  through  the trends in government  financial  assets. 9
3.3.  Baseline  Assumptions
The  model's baseline is  built  on  the  projections provided by  the  New Zealand
Department  of Statistics  and the New Zealand  Treasury  and is based on the following
assumptions:
Long-term  demographic  assumptions
Mortality:  Medium
Fertility:  Medium
Immigration:  15,000  a year until 1999,
5,000 a year thereafter
8  The self-enforcing  fiscal  impact  of the debt  service  and the revenue  from  financial  asset management  make
the modeling  results  highly  sensitive  to the initial  fiscal stance.
9  The  figures  in the paper  report  gross  financial  assets,  which  represent  the sum of the net  financial  assets  and
the gross  debt. In New  Zealand  it is more  intuitive  to observe  assets  rather  than debt  since,  according  to the
baseline  under  the constant  tax rate  approach,  the government  is expected  to hold  a positive  financial  asset position
in the long  term. Gross,  rather  than  net, financial  assets  illustrate  the size  of the problem  of government  financial
asset  management.
When  the government  is indebted  its official  policy  target  is net debt. Consistent  with  current  government
policy,  the baseline  assumes  that the public debt  will be retired  as quickly  as possible. Beginning  in 2008  the
government  finds itself  in a positive  financial  asset  position. No official  policy  target  applies  in such  case.
The  model  arbitrarily  sets  20 percent  of GDP  as the gross  debt  target  with respect  to the smooth  functioning
of the domestic  financial  market. It is presumed  that government  paper  serves  as the benchmark  for interest  rates
and as an inexpensive  and relatively  risk-free  instrument  of domestic  monetary  policy.  In addition,  governments  may
periodically  face the need  to issue  debt.  Government  borrowing  cost  are generally  assumed  to be lower  when the
government  issues  debt  on a regular  rather  than an ad hoc basis.  The target  for the gross  debt  in the model  does
not affect  the modeling  results  to any significant  extent. It should  be noted  that comprehensive  net  worth  would
represent  the most  meaningful  fiscal indicator  if it were  incorporated  into the model  (Bradbury,  Brumby,  and  Skilling
1996).
10Long-term economic assumptions
Growth  in output  per hour:  1.5 percent  a year 10
Unemployment  rate:  6.0 percent
Participation  rate:  77 percent  of working  age population
Average  weekly hours:  39.9
Labor  share in output:  45 percent"
Long-term policy assumptions
Real growth in per capita health spending:  2 percent a year  12
Real growth  in per capita  education  spending:  2 percent  a year
Real growth  in per capita social  welfare spending:  1.5 percent  a year
Real growth  in discretionary  spending:  Set equal  to productivity  growth1 3
Pension  benefits:  As designed  in the Accord' 4
Under these assumptions,  the government  would have to cope with significant
demographic  pressure  on spending  in the future. The old-age  dependence  ratio clearly
reflects the increasing  share of the elderly in New Zealand, the ratio of which to the
working-age  population would more than double by 2050 (figure 1).  (For historical
figures,  see Annex 1.)
The increasing  share of the elderly  in the population  has important  implications  for
tax payers, who, on average, will have to support twice as many pensioners in the
10  This assumption  is comparable  to the OECD  and IMF  (1996a)  forecasts  for industrial  countries. In most
industrial  countries,  the labor  force  is expected  to shrink,  and the assumption  of 1.5 percent  annual  growth  in output
per  hour implies  average  annual  real GDP  growth  of 1.4  percent. Under  the baseline  assumptions,  the labor  force in
New  Zealand  would continue  to grow  and 1.5 percent  growth  in output  per hour in New  Zealand  would  generate  real
GDP  growth  of about  2.6 percent  a year between  1995 and  2010  and about 1.8  percent  a year  between  1995 and
2050.
11  More  weight is placed  on recent  changes  in the labor  market  in New  Zealand  and on continuity  of current
labor  market  policies. The recent  reforms  have brought  about  a significant  reduction  in the share  compensation  of
employees  in output.
12  Baseline  figures  reflect  both historical  and international  spending  trends. They  apeear  high compared  with
recent  years  but low compared  with historical  data  for the past  40 years  in New Zealand,  and  tgiven  current  and
expected  pressures  on social  spending  in New  Zealand  and  other OECD  countries  (Bagrie  1996).
13  It is assumed  that public  administration  and  defense  expenditure  would  grow only  if compensated  for by
efficiency  gains,  thus  at the rate  of productivity  growth. As a result  of the productivity  indexation  of discretionary
expenses  and  the rising  labor  force,  the share  of discretionary  expenses  in GDP  would decline  by half by 2050.
14  The model  assumes  that  the retirement  age is gradually  increased  over  the next  few years  and that the level
of pension  benefits  remains  between  the floor  (65 percent  of average  after-tax  ordinary  time  weekly  earnings)  and
the ceiling  (72 percent  of the average  after-tax  ordinary  time  weekly  earnings)  specified  in the New  Zealand
Superannuation  Accord  for a couple. Under  the baseline  assumptions  the price  indexation  of the NZS  benefit  would
be automatically  replaced  by its wage indexation  at the floor  level in the long term.
1  12040s as they will between 2000 and 2010.  This doubling  of the system  dependence
ratio is shown  in figure 2.15
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'5  The  old age  dependency  ratio  is defined  as the ratio  of persons  of age  65 and older  to the working  age (15  to
64) population.  The system  dependency  ratio  is defined  as  the ratio  of the NZS beneficiaries  to employed. The
number  of beneficiaries  of  the NZS reflects  the scheduled  increase  in the retirement  age.
123.4.  Aggregate  Fiscal  Outcome
Under the baseline assumptions  demographic  pressures  would increase significantly
future  government  spending  as a share of GDP. As figure 3 suggests,  the government
would be able to reduce its total expenses to 32 percent of GDP by the end of the
century and maintain this spending level for about 15 years, after which expenses
would rise and exceed 42 percent  of GDP in the 2040s. (For historical  data see Annex
1 .)
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The  increase in  government expenses associated with an  aging population
reflects mainly increased costs of health care and pensions.  Health spending as a
percentage  of GDP  would increase  to almost 12 percent  of GDP by 2050, and the cost
of NZS would exceed 10 percent  of GDP by the 2030s. Table 2 and figures 4 and 5
project  government  expenses  through  2050;  table 3 compares  the cost of the NZS  with
public pension  schemes  in other industrial  countries.
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14These projections  indicate that under the baseline  assumptions  population aging
would have strong effects on  fiscal  balances in the  long run. Annual education
expenses  would stabilize below 5.5 percent  of GDP; total annual expenses  on social
benefits  would remain  below 8 percent  GDP. The exogeneity  of social  spending  (rather
than its direct linkage  to the productivity  or real GDP growth in the model) reflects  the
fact that social  spending  can often be driven  by demand  or political  discretion.
Table 2.  Baseline  projections  of public  expenditures  on selected  items
(percent  of projected  GDP)
Expense  1995/96  2000/01  2010/11  2030/31  2050/51
NZS  5.7  4.7  5.1  8.8  10.2
Health  5.9  5.5  6.0  9.0  11.8
Education  5.6  5.3  5.4  5.3  5.7
Unemployment  1.4  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
Domestic  purposes  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
Other social  welfare  5.0  4.8  4.7  5.1  5.3
Defense  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9
Debt interest  4.0  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.2
Source: New  Zealand  Treasury  fiscal model.
Table 3.  Baseline  projections  of public pension  spending  in selected  industrial
countries (percent  of projected  GDP)
Country  1995  2000  2010  2030  2050
United  States  4.4  4.3  4.2  7.4  7.7
Japan  5.7  6.5  7.5  8.9  10.7
Germany  10.0  11.1  11.0  18.4  18.7
France  12.5  12.0  12.6  19.4  21.3
Italy  16.0  17.1  15.2  23.3  25.7
United Kingdom  4.4  4.3  4.6  4.7  3.4
Canada  4.4  4.5  4.9  7.5  7.1
Sweden  8.5  8.2  8.1  9.2  7.4
New  Zealand  5.7  4.7  5.1  8.8  10.2
Average  7.9  8.1  8.1  12.0  12.5
Source: Estimates  by IMF staff and  the New  Zealand  Treasury  fiscal model.
To illustrate  the options for financing  future government  spending,  figure 6 plots
the required balanced budget tax revenue against the constant tax rate tax revenue.
The constant  tax rate for the tax-smoothing  approach  has been set (using  two small tax
cuts during 1998-2000) so  that  it  allows the  government to  accumulate sufficient
15financial assets to withstand future demographic  pressures  and reach the year 2050
with net debt converging  to zero.  As figure 6 shows, with the constant  tax rate the
government would receive more tax revenues than are  necessary to balance the
annual budgets  and would thus accumulate  financial assets  through 2025. After 2025
demographic  factors would cause deficits,  which would be financed by the previously
accumulated  financial  assets. 16 (For the  financial asset  position,  see section  4.1.)
Figure  6. Balanced  budget  tax revenue  versus constant  tax rate tax revenue:
Baseline  case
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The value of the gross financial assets accumulated in the constant tax rate
approach  to pre-fund the expected growth in liabilities and deficits until 2050 would
need to approach about 100 percent of GDP by the early 2030s.  (The dynamics in
government  financial assets and the pros and cons related to such pre-funding are
discussed  in section  4.)
16  Allowing  for the necessary  pre-funding  of  the growth  in government  liabilities  the constant  tax rate  approach
would  thus implicitly  transform  NZS from a pure PAYG  scheme  into a partly  funded  scheme.
163.5.  Sensitivity  Analysis
Sensitivity  analysis can be performed  by examining  the effect of changes in selected
economic,  demographic  and policy  assumptions.
Long-term  economic  assumptions
Productivity  growth:  1.0%, 1  .5%, 2.0%
GDP  share of employees  compensation:  39%, 45%, 51%
Unemployment  rate:  5%, 6%, 7%
Participation  rate:  75%, 77%, 79%
Long-term  demographic  assumptions
Net migration  since 2000: 5,000, 15,000
Fertility/mortality:  low/low, medium/medium,  high/high
high/low, medium/medium,  low/high
Long-term  policy assumptions
Health  care (real  growth  in per capita  spending):  1.5%,  2.0%,  2.5% a year
Education  (real  growth  in per capita  spending):  1.5%, 2.0%, 2.5% a year
Social  welfare (real  growth  in per capita  spending):  1.0%, 1.5%, 2.0% a year
Pension  benefits  (NZS  floor):  52.5%, 65%, 72.5%  17
3.5.1.  Changes  in economic  assumptions
a)  Productivity  growth
The share of government  spending  in GDP is very sensitive  to the growth in output  per
hour.  This sensitivity  stems mainly from the differential between productivity  growth
and the real growth in per capita social spending  . 8 In the sensitivity testing, the
17  Modeling  of the floor levels  is the most convenient  way for  showing  the fiscal impact  of alternative  pension
benefits  levels. In  the selected  range  52.5  percent  of the after-tax  average  ordinary  time weekly  earnings  reflects
the current  level  of unemployment  benefits. The 72.5  percent  level  represents  the existing  NZS  ceiling. The upper
level  thus illustrates  the effects  of pensions  reaching  the level  of the existing  NZS  ceiling. This  situation  may  occur
as a result  of a policy  decision  or a lack of productivity  growth,  which  would allow  NZS benefits  to become  inflation-
indexed  and  grow  faster  than earnings.
For other assumptions  the ranges  for the sensitivity  tests are  set  to reflect  the possible  deviations  based  on
historical  and international  data. Ideally,  the sensitivity  ranges  for each  variable  would be calibrated  to one  standard
deviation  either  side of  the baseline  assumption.  Calibration  based  on a comprehensive  analysis  of the historical
and international  data  is, however,  not likely  to diverge  substantially  from  the ranges  set here  and is not likely  to
reverse  the interpretation  of the sensitivity  tests.
18  Since  discretionary  expenditure  is growing  at a rate  set equal  to productivity  growth  (and  the baseline  labor
force  is steadily  increasing),  government  discretionary  spending  is declining  as a share  of GDP in both  the low-  and
17baseline assumption  of 2 percent real growth in per capita social spending (excluding
the NZS) is retained  for both the low and high levels  of productivity  growth. As a result
the observed  share of government  spending  rises under  the low growth  assumption. 19
Figure 7 shows the effect of changes  in productivity.  An increase  in the long-term
productivity growth to 2 percent a year would allow the government  to finance its
projected  expenses and even introduce  tax cuts while maintaining  a positive  financial
assets position in the long run.  A decrease in the long-term productivity  growth  to 1
percent a year would force the government  to increase  taxes significantly  in order to
prevent  the projected  decline  in its financial  assets  or to reduce  spending.
Figure 7. Effects  of changes  in productivity  on balanced  budget  tax revenue
with respect to productivity growth: 1%, 1.5% and 2.0% (respectively, from the top)
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high-growth  cases. (With  productivity  growth  of 1 percent,  the resulting  long-term  average  real  GDP  growth  would
reach  about 1.3  percent.)
19  The share  of employees'  compensation  in GDP  is assumed  to remain  at its baseline  level  of 45 percent
during  the entire period. There is, however,  historical  evidence  that even  in the long  run periods  of higher  growth  are
correlated  with higher  shares  of profits  and declining  shares  of returns  to labor,  and  long-term  periods  of slow  growth
are  correlated  with declining  profits  and a larger  total wage  bill as a percentage  of GDP. Thus,  in modeling  different
growth  scenarios  attention  should  be given  to analysis  of the likely  shifts  in the coefficients  of the Cobb-Douglas
production  function. This paper  shows  the sensitivity  of total government  expenditure  and NZS  cost  with respect  to
changes  in the returns  to labor.
18Figure  8. Effect  of changes  in productivity  on gross  financial  assets
with respect  to  productivity  growth:  2%,  1.5%  and  1%  (respectively,  from  the top)
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b)  Relative  returns  to labor
Held constant at the  baseline level of 45  percent, the  share of compensation of
employees  (COE),  is low to reflect  the experience  of New  Zealand and other industrial
economies  and to accommodate  scenarios  for slow economic  growth. In the long term
the GDP share of the total wage bill is both cyclical and irregular. Moreover,  the aging
labor force can affect the relative returns  on labor.  20  (The figures in Annex 2 illustrate
that the baseline level of 45 percent is low compared  with the historical  data for New
Zealand and other OECD countries  and that this baseline  level is more likely in a high-
growth  than in a low-growth  scenario.)
20  The  argument  used  in discussion  of Cutler  et al. (1990)  that starting  with 'the standard  hypothesis  that
relative  wages reflect  relative  marginal  products  and  that  the projected  aging  will raise  future  productivity  as more
workers  move  into their  high-productivity  years"  would particularly  apply in a slow-growing  economy  with less
technological  progress.  A fast-growing  economy  with greater  technological  progress  is more  likely  to 'displace'
older  workers,  who are  less adaptable  to the new  technologies,  and  to prevent  their productivity  from benefiting  from
their  long-term  work  experience.
To enhance  the quality  of the assumptions  about  the GDP  share  of COE,  which  are crucial  for forecasting  the
future  NZS  cost in both  the baseline  and the low/high-growth  scenarios  the possible  trends  and international
convergence  in the ratio  of returns  on labor  and  to the returns  on capital  should  be researched.
19On the fiscal front changes in the level of the GDP share of COE would affect
revenues  as well as expenses. Since the tax rate applied on COE is higher than the
rate applied on other income, government  revenue increases automatically  when the
GDP-share  of COE rises.  Thus, if individual  tax rates remain constant, the average
income  tax rate would increase  as income  shares  shift from  capital  to COE.
On the expenditure  side the main effect would come from the wage indexation  of
the floor and ceiling of the NZS. Government  expenses  on the NZS  would increase  as
the share of COE in GDP rose. Should  the share of COE in New Zealand return to its
historical levels or converge  to the levels of Australia or the United States,  the future
cost of the NZS would rise by about 1 percent of GDP a year.  (The 51 percent level
conforms to the historical average in Australia and is significantly  below the ratio of
COE  to GDP in the United  States during  the past 50 years.)
Figure  9.  Effect of changes in GDP share of employee compensation  on NZS
spending
with respect to the share of COE in GDP  51%, 45% and 39% (respectively, from the top)
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Figure 10 shows that the government  would need to raise more revenue as a
percentage  of GDP  in order  to finance  the higher  cost of wage-indexed  benefits.
20Figure 10.  Effect of changes in GDP share of employee compensation  on
balanced  budget  tax revenue








28  - |  .I 
96197  00/01  10/11  20/21  30/31  40/41  50/51
The constant  tax rate approach  indicates,  however,  that the revenue  gain from  the
increase in COE would exceed the increase in government  expenses. With a higher
COE, the share of government  spending in GDP and the average income tax in the
economy would rise.  Individual income tax rates, however, could be cut if net debt
were to converge  to zero by 2050.
21Figure  11.  Effect of  change in  GDP share of employee compensation  on
gross  financial  assets
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c)  Unemployment  rate
Higher unemployment  would exacerbate  the government's  fiscal position directly, by
increasing expenses on  unemployment  benefits, and, indirectly, by  reducing GDP
growth.  By raising the system dependency ratio a higher unemployment  rate would
also increase  the per taxpayer  burden  of the NZS.
Figures 12 and 13 compare  the required balanced budget tax revenue and the
constant  tax rate financial position of the government  for unemployment  rates of 5 and
7 percent,  with the baseline rate of 6 percent (estimated  to be just 0.5 percent above
the current estimate of the New Zealand NAIRU).  This simulation  shows that future
fiscal balances are  not very  sensitive to  unemployment rates.  However, should
unemployment  rise, taxes  would have to be increased  in order to maintain  government
financial  assets  above  zero.
22Figure 12.  Effect of change in  unemployment rate on  balanced budget  tax
revenue
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Figure 13.  Effect of change in unemployment rate on gross financial assets
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23d)  Participation rate
The effect on fiscal balances  of changes  in the participation  rate is similar  to the effect
of unemployment. Figures 14 and  15 show the fiscal outlook with respect to the
participation  rates of 79 and 75 percent,  compared  to the baseline  level of 77 percent.
Figure 14.  Effect of change in the participation  rate on balanced budget tax
revenue
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Figure 15.  Effect of change in the participation rate on gross financial assets
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243.5.2.  Changes  in demographic  assumptions
a)  Net migration
Figures 16 - 19 demonstrate  that higher net migration  may mitigate  the negative  fiscal
consequences  of an aging society  because  of the expected  age distribution  of migrants
who are more likely than the resident  population  to be of working age.  They compare
the fiscal effects of immigration  of 15,000  a year throughout  the entire time period  with
the  baseline annual  immigration 15,000 until  year  1999 and  5,000  afterwards
(according  to data available  in the New  Zealand Department  of Statistics).
Relative  to the resident  population migrants  would contribute more in taxes than
they receive in services and would thus reduce  the system dependency  ratio and the
per taxpayer cost of the NZS.  Because immigrants'  skills are assumed to match the
needs of the economy, both the baseline case and the sensitivity  tests assume that
migration  does not  alter any economic  variables  (such as the unemployment  rate).
Figure 16.  Effect of change in net migration on system  dependency  ratio
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25Figure 17.  Effect of change in net migration on NZS  spending
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Figure 18.  Effect of change in net migration on balanced budget tax revenue
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26Figure  19.  Effect  of change  in net migration  on gross  financial  assets
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b)  Fertility  and mortality
Rates of fertility and mortality negatively affect fiscal balances if they lead to
higher proportions  of children and the elderly (and a lower proportion of the working
population).
The sensitivity  tests indicate  that fiscal balances  are strongest  when both fertility
and mortality  rates are high. Compared  with the baseline,  low fertility/low  mortality  and
2  1 high fertility/low mortality  worsen the future fiscal position.  Low mortality (high life
expectancy)  is the leading factor weakening  the fiscal stance since spending on the
elderly  exceeds  spending  on children.
The  worst fiscal  imbalance would result under the  low fertility/low mortality
scenario,  under  which  the system  dependency  ratio  would approach  70 percent  (nearly
21  All of  these alternatives  assume  the baseline  immigration  figure (15,000  until 1999  and 5,000  thereafter)  and
had  been  provided  by NZ  Department  of Statistics. Mortality  rates  reflect  mainly  life expectancy  at birth. Low
mortality  assumes  an increase  in life  expectancy  of about seven  years;  high  mortality  assumes  an increase  in life
expenctancy  of about 3 years  by the year  2050.
27three times its current level,  the cost of health care  would rise to more than 13 percent
of GDP, and the cost of the NZS would rise to more than 12 percent of GDP by the
2040s.
The second worst case is high fertility/low mortality,  which combines a relatively
high share of long-living  elderly  with a relatively  high share of children. In the long run
high fertility increases  the size of the labor force,  thus partly offsetting  the impact  of low
mortality  on the system  dependence  ratio  and the fiscal accounts.
The low fertility/high mortality scenario begins to exert fiscal pressure on the
system later than either of the low mortality scenarios, allowing the government to
accumulate  more financial  assets  through  the 2030s.  In the very long term (longer  than
the modeled time interval), however, low fertility would significantly  reduce the size of
the labor force and thus make  the fiscal position of the government  less favorable  than
under  the baseline  case (see  figures  20 - 23).
Figure 20.  Effects  of changes  in fertility  and mortality  on balanced  budget  tax
revenue
with respect  to fertilitylmortality:  low/low,  medium/medium,  and  high/high  (respectively  from the  top)
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28Figure  21.  Effect of changes  in fertility  and mortality  on gross  financial
assets
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Figure  22.  Effects  of changes  in fertility  and mortality  on balanced  budget  tax
revenue
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29Figure  23.  Effects  of changes  in fertility  and mortality  on gross  financial
assets
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3.5.3.  Changes  policy  assumptions
a)  Health
The sensitivity analysis reveals that small changes in the real growth of per capita
health spending are  magnified by  demographic factors in  the  long term,  as  an
increasing  share of the population  moves into the older age cohorts. A 0.5 percentage
point change in the real growth of per capita health spending causes a shift in total
health expenses of more than 3 percentage  points of GDP by the 2050 (see figure
24).22
22  In  the aggregate  baseline  real  growth of 2 percent  in per  capita  health  spending  comes  to about  3 percent
average  annual real  growth  in total public health  spending. In  the sensitivity  test for health  spending,  the 1.5  percent
per capita  real  growth  leads  to about 2.6 percent  total real  growth;  the 2.5 percent  per capita  real  growth  brings
about  3.5 percent  real  growth  in total.
30Figure 24.  Effect of change in real growth  in per capita health spending  on
total health expenses
with respect to the growth in health spending per capita: 2.5%, 2.0% and 1.5% (respectively from the top)
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Figure 25.  Effect of change in real growth in per capita health spending on
balanced budget tax revenue
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31Figure  26.  Effect of change in real growth in per capita health spending oni
gross  financial  assets
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b)  Education
The impact  of demographic  changes  on education  spending  is relatively  weak. A 0.5
percentage  point  change  in real per capita growth  of education  spending  is associated
with a change  in total education  spending  to GDP of 1.5  percentage  points in the long
term. Figures  27 and 28 show  the effects  of this change  on balanced  budget  tax
revenue  and government  gross financial  assets.
32Figure 27.  Effect of change in growth of per capita education spending on
balanced budget tax revenue
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Figure 28.  Effect of change in growth of per capita education spending on
gross financial assets
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33C)  Social welfare
Figures  29 and 30 may  appear to indicate  that the government's  future fiscal position  is
largely  insensitive to  changes in  the  real  growth  in  social  welfare  (such  as
unemployment,  domestic purposes and other) benefits.  It should be noted that the
level of social welfare benefits  may have significant  behavioral  effects, however,  which
are not reflected in the model.  The alternative benefit levels may affect economic
growth  and thus exacerbate  the long-term  fiscal impact.
Figure 29.  Effect of  change in  growth of  per capita welfare spending on
balanced  budget  tax revenue
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34Figure  30.  Effect  of change  in growth  of per  capita  welfare  spending  on gross
financial  assets
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d)  Pensions  (NZS  Floor)
Adjustments  to  the  NZS floor represent  a  powerful instrument  with which the
23
government  can contain  (or  expand)  its future liabilities  . The alternative  floor levels
are  set at 52.5  and  72.5  percent  of after-tax  weekly  ordinary  earnings  for a couple.  The
lower level reflects  the current  level of unemployment  benefits  in New  Zealand;  the
upper level reflects  the existing  NZS  ceiling.  Figures  31 - 33 show the effects  of
changes  in these  levels  on NZS  expenses,  the required  balanced-budget  tax revenues
and  gross  financial  assets.
23  Pensions  are  indexed  to prices  until  they hit  the floor. Once  they hit the floor  they reflect  the growth  in wages.
Theoretically,  should  inflation  exceed  productivity  growth,  pensions  would  grow  relative  to wages  until  hitting  the
ceiling.
35Figure 31.  Effects of change in NZS  floor on NZS  expenses
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Figure 32.  Effects of change in NZS  floor on balanced budget tax revenue
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36Figure  33.  Effects  of change  in NZS  floor on gross  financial  assets











The accumulation  of gross financial assets under the 52.5 percent  floor suggests
that the government  could  cut taxes in the near  future and still pre-fund  its future liability
increase.  Figure 34 illustrates  the size of the possible tax cut by plotting balanced
budget tax revenue against constant tax rate tax revenues  for 65 and 52.5 percent
floors.  To pre-fund  future increase in liabilities  given the lower floor the government
would have to manage a smaller amount  of assets than under the baseline  case. The
peak in the accumulation  of financial  assets needed  by 2025-2030  would drop by about
10 percent  of GDP.
37Figure  34.  Effects of change in NZS floor on balanced budget tax revenue
versus constant  tax rate tax revenue
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3.5.4.  Conclusions  from sensitivity  analysis
What conclusions  can be drawn about the sensitivity  of the future fiscal position  of the
New  Zealand  government?
1.  Sensitivity  to a gap between  productivity  growth  and real growth  per capita  in
health  spending  is  very  strong.  A  long-term economic slow  down  without  a
proportionate  reduction in health and other social spending would cause a significant
24 aggravation  in the fiscal position.  Analysis  of the historical  and international  data on
trends  in social  spending  may indicate  the expected  urgency  of this matter.
2.  Sensitivity to net migration is strong, suggesting that  adoption of a  sensible
migration  policy  with respect  to the age, skills, fertility,  and mortality  profiles of potential
immigrants  could  partly offset future  demographic  pressures.
24  Optimally,  the linkage  between  social  spending  and productivity  growth  would be developed  across  business
cycles. A year-by-year  indexation  of social  spending  to productivity  growth  would be sub optimal  with respect  to the
demand  for social  spending,  which  rises  during  recession.
383.  Sensitivity to the pension floor level is strong.  The literature indicates  that the
level of public pension  generosity may also affect private  saving.  Further  study of the
international  and New Zealand experience  with past changes in the level of public
pensions  could  shed light on the full impact  of the NZS  benefit  level.
4.  Sensitivity to the GDP share of employee compensation is significant, mainly
because  of the eventual  wage indexation  of NZS benefits. Sensitivity  of NZS spending
to shifts in the GDP share  of COE is obviously  positively  correlated  with the level of the
NZS  benefit. Research  on the possible  impact of an aging labor force on the marginal
productivity  of labor  and on the ratio of returns  to labor to returns  to capital  may indicate
the urgency  of this factor.
5.  Sensitivity to the average unemployment  and participation rates is  moderate.
Increases in these rates would slow GDP growth, exacerbate future demographic
pressures,  and endanger future fiscal balances.  Research  is needed  to evaluate the
likely effects of  an  aging population and  of  increases in the  retirement age  on
unemployment  and participation  rates.
3.6.  Selected  Scenarios
3.6.1.  An economic  slow down
Since the fiscal model does not provide for less direct linkages between economic
variables, a  comprehensive economic analysis and  multiple adjustments to  the
25 assumptions  in the model are needed  to simulate an economic  slow down.  Slower
economic  growth is likely to be associated  with both slower productivity  growth and a
higher  unemployment  and lower  participation  rate.
Figure  35 shows  the significant  effect of 0.5 percentage  point  drop in productivity
growth  to 1 percent,  an increase  of 1 percentage  point in the unemployment  rate to 7
percent,  and a 2 percentage  point  drop in the participation  rate to 75 percent. Holding
other assumptions  at their baseline  levels,  the negative  fiscal consequences  are quite
large.
25  To develop  the alternative  scenarios  in a consistent  manner  correlations  between  variables  used  within  the
model  should  be studied  so that  the assumptions  used  are internally  consistent. For  such an exercise,  analysis  of
the relevant  historical  and international  trends  as well as "most  likely  policy"  assumptions  would be necessary.
39Figure 35.  Effect of change in economic assumptions on balanced budget tax
revenue
1% productivity growth, 7% unemployment and 75% participation rate versus the baseline
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Figure 36.  Effect of change in economic assumptions on gross financial
assets
the baseline versus 1% productivity growth, 7% unemployment and 75% participation
(respectively from the top)
100  ...







403.6.2.  Social  spending  increase  versus  tightening
The effect of an increase  in the growth  of spending  on health,  education,  and welfare is
similar to that of a decrease in productivity  growth (see section 3.5.1.a). This fact  is
consistent  with  the argument  that it is mainly  the difference  between  productivity  growth
and real growth in per capita government  spending that affects the long-term fiscal
position.  In an aging society government spending policies thus may serve as an
effective  instrument  with which  to contain (or exacerbate)  increases  in liabilities.
Figures  37 and 38 show, the fiscal outcomes  associated  with the alternative  real
growth rates in per capita aggregate  social spending  on health,  education, and social
welfare.
Figure  37.  Effect of change in real growth rate of per capita social spending
on balanced  budget  tax revenue
with respect to the aggregate social spending per capita growth
health and education 2.5%, 2% and 1 5%, and welfare 2%, 1 5% and 1% (respectively from the top)
46
44
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41Figure  38.  Effect  of change  in real  growth  rate of per capita  social  spending
on gross financial  assets
with respect to the aggregate social spending per capita growth:
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3.7.  Conclusions  from  the Model
Results of the sensitivity  tests and the various scenarios  suggest that the forecasted
fiscal position depends critically on  the baseline assumptions.  Less conservative
baseline assumptions (such as 2 percent productivity growth a year) lead to much
brighter fiscal outlooks.  A  detailed analysis of the  baseline assumptions is thus
necessary  before the results of the model are interpreted. Similarly,  since the model
fails to link developments  in key economic  variables  (such as unermployment,  inflation,
and productivity  growth) or to reflect the possible behavioral and economic effects of
government policies (such as the crowding-out  effect), modeling of alternative future
economic  developments  requires a comprehensive  analysis of multiple adjustments  in
the assumptions.
Under the  baseline assumptions the  future fiscal  position appeared highly
sensitive  to  even  small  changes  in  the  economic,  demographic, and  policy
assumptions.
42Government  may limit the effect of future demographic  pressures and prevent
future risks of major fiscal imbalances by containing the growth of social spending,
particularly spending on  health, the  NZS, and welfare.  The  sensitivity tests and
scenarios  suggest that linking real per capita growth in social spending  to productivity
growth across business cycles and reducing  the level of NZS benefits (while favoring
their indexation  to inflation  rather than to wages) would significantly  reduce  the problem
of rising  government  liabilities.
4.  Financing  Projected  Spending
The government  of New Zealand could attempt to maintain  tax rates at their current
level and to  partially pre-fund the  future increase in  liabilities.  Alternatively, the
government  could cut taxes over the next 10-20 years and increase taxes in 30-40
years.
4.1.  Constant  Tax Rate
The pre-funding of the future increase in government liabilities needed under the
constant  tax rate approach  would require  the government  to accumulate  and manage
gross financial  assets  of up to 100  percent  of GDP (net financial  assets  of 80 percent  of
26 GDP).  Such an increase  in public saving during the next thirty years, even if partly
offset by a decrease in private saving, is likely to result in a higher level of national
saving. The pre-funding  approach  would implicitly  transform  the existing NZS system
into a partly  funded scheme.
26  By releasing  the 20 percent  of GDP  gross  debt  target,  the government  could  reduce  its maximum  pre-funding
requirement  during  the early  2030s  to about  80 percent  of GDP.  (In the balanced-budget-tax-rate  approach,  net debt
would remain  at  zero level,  and gross  financial  assets  would  equal  the gross  debt,  which  is set a priori  at  the level  of
20 percent  of GDP.)
43Figure  39.  Pre-funding  the future increase in liabilities in constant tax rate
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The size of the forecasted earnings to the government from managing  these
financial assets is illustrated  in the dynamics  of non tax revenues,  which is shown as
the difference  between  the government  total and tax revenues  (figure  40).
Empirical  evidence  suggests,  however,  that governments  often fail to insulate  their
pension funds from political (mis)use and thus do not always manage their financial
assets  profitably. 27
27  Real  returns  on publicly  managed  pension  reserves  have been  negative  in most  countries  (World  Bank  1994
and Mitchell  1993). The reasons  include  weak  accountability  and incentives,  inefficient  regulations  and monitoring,
political  pressures  to invest into public  projects  and government  paper,  low nominal  interest  rates,  volatile  inflation,
and restrictions  on international  diversification  (World  Bank  1994  and Davis 1993). In many  countries  with a
compulsory  fully funded  scheme  the provident  funds  earned  negative  returns  (World  Bank  1994). For analysis  of  the
associated  risks,  see also  Bradbury,  Brumby,  and Skilling  1996.
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4.2.  Balanced  budget  tax revenue
By balancing  the budget every year the government  would maintain  zero net debt and
accumulate  zero net financial assets. This approach  would allow taxes to be reduced
over the next thirty years.  Lower tax levels could bring about efficiency gains and
higher  economic  growth  and thus limit  the need to increase  taxes in the following  years.
The model, however,  does not consider any possible efficiency  gains.  The financing
scenario  below  thus corresponds  to the baseline  assumptions.
In the real world revenues  do not change instantaneously  to reflect spending,  and
tax  rates would  not  be  adjusted annually.  To  maintain balanced budgets, the
government  could introduce  a series of tax cuts over the next ten to fifteen years and
tax increases  later on. Figure  41 shows  a possible  profile  of the tax adjustments.
45Figure  41.  Possible  adjustments  in tax revenue:  Baseline  case
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Under this quasi-balanced budget approach, the  government does not raise
significant non-tax revenues from financial assets.  Tax revenue between 1995 and
2050 under  this approach  would thus be higher  than the tax revenue needed  under  the
constant  tax rate approach. (This explains  why the sum of the tax increases  exceeds
the sum of the tax cuts.) 28
Figure 42 illustrates the government's  financial position and its sensitivity  to tax
adjustments.  (In the modeling of this situation, the objective was to simulate tax
adjustments  so that net debt remains  near zero.  The levels of gross financial assets
thus converge  to the gross  debt target.)
28  No potential  efficiency  gains  from the tax reductions  are considered.
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The expected  fiscal pressures  are illustrated  in the operating  balance (figure 43).
During the next fifteen years surpluses continue to increase  following each tax cut.
Beginning  in 2020, however,  deficits  develop  and prevail  after  each tax increase.
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474.3.  The Tradeoffs
The possible tradeoffs between the two financing options warrant further research.
Under  the constant  tax rate approach  public  and national  saving  increase  and efficiency
rises as a result of tax smoothing,  but the government  is left to manage large financial
assets.  Under the balanced budget tax revenue approach, private saving increases,
efficiency  rises as a result of low tax rates (during  the next twenty years), and financial
assets are managed  by the private sector, but tax rate adjustments  that may create
uncertainty  in the economy and be inequitable  from an intergenerational  perspective
are necessary.
To examine intergenerational  equity in the cost-benefit  analysis of the different
financing scenarios it  may  be  advisable to  apply the  baseline assumptions and
sensitivity tests to the New Zealand generational  accounts (Kotlikoff 1995).  A quick
look at the tax cuts and tax increases under the balanced budget financing option
suggests  that the generation  entering the work force at the end of this century would
enjoy relatively low taxes, retire just in time to avoid the tax increases and enjoy a
greater life expectancy with pensions as generous as the previous generation but
financed  from the higher  taxes  of following  generation.
Options that  would allow for tax  smoothing at  lower tax  levels and without
requiring the  government to  manage large public assets  could be  achieved by
containing demographic pressures on future spending.  The  sensitivity tests and
scenarios presented in the  previous sections indicate that  effective strategies for
containing  the fiscal effects of an aging population  involve tight control over spending
on health  and pensions.
Policies  that offer further  tax cuts in exchange  for a reduction  in future benefits  are
also likely to bring economic gain.  For example, international  evidence (section 2)
suggests  that the expected  size of public pensions  is negatively  correlated  with private
saving.  Thus, a lower expected level of NZS benefits is likely to induce the current
generation  to use any additional  disposable  income  from tax cuts for private  saving  for
retirement. Individuals  could invest their funds according  to their own risk preference.
The resulting  investment  level is likely  to be higher  (compared  with  the balanced  budget
48approach under a constant pension level) and the allocation of capital more efficient
(compared  with the constant  tax rate, government  pre-funding  approach).
In addition,  tax cuts in exchange  for reductions  in future pension  benefits  are likely
to be fair from the perspective  of inter generational  equity.  The current generation
would enjoy lower taxes without burdening the future generations as  much.  This
hypothesis  could be tested by applying the assumptions  described  above to the New
Zealand generational  accounts  (Auerbach,  Baker,  Kotlikoff  1995).
5.  Conclusions
The fiscal position of  the government of  New Zealand, like that  of other  OECD
governments,  will begin to feel the effects  of an aging population  as the cost health care
and pension payments rise.  A drop in productivity growth or an increase in social
spending relative to the baseline case could exacerbate  the negative  effect on fiscal
balances.
The financing  of future liabilities  presents  major policy challenges. With tax rates
maintained  at current levels the government  could pre-fund  the future increases  in its
liabilities through 2050.  Such pre-funding would mean that  by the 2020s-30s the
government would be  managing net  financial assets worth  80  percent of  GDP,
however.  Under a balanced budget approach  the government  could cut taxes in the
next 10 to 15  years but  would have  to increase  taxes by even  more twenty  years later.
Sensitivity  tests suggest  that tight control  over social  spending  will be necessary  to
reduce the fiscal burden of the aging population and the fragility of future fiscal
balances. Cross-country  experiences  suggesting  a negative  correlation  between  public
pension  and private  saving levels  imply  that reduction  in the level of NZS  benefits  could
bring about significant gains on the economic as well as the fiscal side.  Transfer of
responsibility  for health care and pension provision  to the private  sector  could allow for
tax  cuts without necessitating large tax  increases later.  Thus, the benefit of tax
smoothing could be achieved at tax rates that are lower than the model's baseline
rates, without relying on the government  to accumulate  and manage large financial
assets.
49Annex figure 2.  The aggregate social spending
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512. Compensation  of Employees  and Economic  Growth
A comparison  of figures on the compensation  of employees (COE as percentages  of
GDP) suggests that  today's  level of  employee compensation in  New Zealand is
relatively  low both in international  comparisons  and from a historical  perspective  (see
annex figures 6-8).  In modeling  the long-term  cost of the NZS it may be beneficial  to
explore likely future developments  in employee  compensation  in an aging society and
under  different assumptions  about  technological  progress  and GDP  growth.
Annex  figure  6.  Employees  compensation  in New Zealand:
Compensation  of Employees  (%  of GDP,  left scale)
versus  Real  GDP  Growth  (%,  right  scale)  higher  GDP
growth
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53Annex figure  7.  Employee  compensation  in Australia
Compensation  of Employees  (%  of GDP, left  scale)
versus Real GDP Growth  (% right scale)
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The long-term  average  in compensation  of employees  in Australia is 51 percent  of
GDP. This value  is still lower  than  any COE level in the US  during  the past 50 years.
Annex figure  8.  Employee  compensation  in the United  States:
Compensation  of Employees  (%  of  GDP,  left  scale)
versus  Real  GDP  Growth  (%,  right  scale)
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